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FICINO, AVICENNA AND  
THE OCCULT POWERS OF THE RATIONAL SOUL 
 
 
  The modern literature on Ficino’s magical theory stresses that it is primarily a 
natural or spiritual magic, i.e., to quote D. P. Walker, “a non-demonic magic, utilizing the 
spiritus mundi and reaching no higher than the human spirit.”  For Walker, Ficino’s 
magic is entirely subjective in its effects, not transitive: i.e., it is meant to transform the 
operator rather than to have effects outside the body of the operator such as is the case 
with  “fascination, telepathy, medical incantations, and most of the operations of 
witchcraft.”
1 This subjective natural magic works by focussing the imagination, a power 
of the lower, body-oriented part of the soul, on the spiritus, defined by Ficino as 
 
a certain vapor of the blood, pure, subtle, hot and lucid.  And, formed from the 
subtler blood by the heat of the heart, it flies to the brain, and there the soul 
assiduously employs it for the exercise of both the interior and exterior senses.
2  
 
Spiritus is, in other words, a tertium quid between soul and body, extremely rarified and 
invisible, but still a physical substance. It is by means of spiritus that good influences 
from music, odors, colors, foods and astral influences can be transmitted to the body and 
bring it into harmony with the soul and physical nature, thus granting it health.  Ficino also dallied with a higher, demonic kind of magic – higher because it used the power of 
words to address good planetary demons, rational and language-using beings. Walker is 
at some pains to show that Ficino also practiced (covertly) this kind of demonic magic, 
despite the dangers of doing so. 
  The contention of this article is that the above characterization of Ficino’s magic 
is incomplete and distorted because it neglects the more ambitious side of Ficino’s magic 
which is not found in the De vita (written 1480s, published 1489) but in two of Ficino’s 
works written more than a decade before the De vita, namely his epitomes of the Laws 
(composed 1470s, published 1484) and preeminently in the Platonic Theology (composed 
c. 1474, published 1482).  In these works we find a theory of magic derived primarily 
from Avicenna that emphasizes the extraordinary power over nature that can be exercised 
by the highest power of the human soul, the animus or rational soul, both within one’s 
own body and upon other bodies and indeed upon the whole body of nature.
3 Using this 
more ambitious mental (or angelic) magic the human soul can exploit occult 
correspondences in the cosmos to cause paranormal phenomena such as telepathy, 
levitation, prophecy, sorcery, and miracles.  This aspect of Ficino’s magical theory has 
not been entirely ignored in the modern secondary literature, but it has typically been 
seen through the prism of Walker’s emphasis on the lower psychic power of imagination 
or phantasy.
4 Indeed, thanks to the prestige of two great Warburgians, Frances Yates and 
D. P. Walker, Ficino’s magic has ordinarily been seen as a low-level, gentle, unambitious 
magic, offering a contrast in this respect with the exalted, power-hungry, cabalistic magic 
of Pico.  Ficino is the magician of the natural world, content with facilitating health and 
well-being; Pico is the magician of the intelligible world, aiming to exploit angelic forces to attain unlimited power for the human race.
5  As we shall see, this is incorrect:  Ficino 
too developed a theory of angelic magic that attributed great power to the human soul, 
and he did this at least a decade before Pico.
6 Ficino’s magic has been mischaracterized 
because modern students of his theories of the occult have focussed on the De vita, his 
main work on the subject, which explicitly presents itself as a program for non-demonic, 
non-transitive operations, limited to healing and harmonizing human nature. Renaissance 
authors knew better: Gianfrancesco Pico, Pomponazzi, Pedro Mexia, Fabio Paolini and 
Thomas Erastus all credited Ficino with a transitive soul-magic derived from Avicenna.
7 
And modern students of Avicenna have emphasized that the Arabic philosopher’s theory 
of the occult powers of the prophetic soul is based not only on the soul’s power of 
imagination, but also on its powers of  will and intuitive intellect.
8  This makes it all the 
more remarkable that modern scholarship has practically ignored this more ambitious 
strain in Ficino’s magical theory. 
As is well known, Ficino’s magical theory presupposes a Neoplatonic view of the 
cosmos, both physical and intelligible. Like all Neoplatonic cosmologies it has a high 
degree of “connectivity” (to use a word from the computer world):  it is characterized by 
a web of sympathies and correspondences and dependencies that hold it together in 
variegated unity beneath the One. It is this web of correspondences which enables 
magical operations, ensuring that actions performed in one part of the system will be 
passed to other parts. Indeed, it is not going too far to say that Ficino’s view of creation 
as a whole is magical, in the sense that nothing occurring anywhere in it is without some 
influence on the whole. “All Nature is a magician,” as Ficino remarks near the end of the 
De vita.
9 Since the correspondences are “vertical” as well as “horizontal” – i.e. since physical objects are connected not only by natural sympathies and spiritus with other 
physical objects, but also stand in dependency on mathematica and higher immaterial 
realities – it is possible in principle for physical objects to respond in harmonic unison, as 
it were, to impulses from those higher realities, rather than by direct physical 
transmission from one bodily thing to another via spiritus.  It is this vertical connectivity 
which enables the magical powers of the rational soul to act upon physical nature. 
It may, of course, be debated whether paranormal powers of the soul are properly 
described as magical, but to answer this question would lead us into the learned maze of 
definitional and methodological questions regarding magic that would admit of no 
universally satisfactory resolution.  Personally I doubt that Ficino would have strongly 
distinguished between the paranormal powers of the soul and the magical influences 
latent in material objects and transmitted through Spirit. They were all windows on the 
world’s wonder; all part of the same system interpenetrated at every point with divine 
power and open at every point to manipulation by strong souls and persons with 
knowledge of the occult relations subsisting between the several parts of the cosmos. The 
soul is not peripheral to nature, but the central part of the cosmic machine, connected 
with everything above and below it in the order of nature.  In a marvellous image, Ficino 
compares the soul in the cosmos to the fetus in the womb: 
 
Through its head, that is, its mind, our soul is bound to higher minds; through its 
lowest power, the idolum, with which it rules the body, our soul is in accord with 
the idola of the higher souls; and through its body’s nature into which the idolum 
is woven, our soul is united with the natures of the world’s bodies – natures prior 
to this body’s nature.  Thus we are bound to the whole machine [of the world] by 
these three ropes, as it were: by our mind to minds, by our idolum to idola, and by our nature to natures. Similarly the fetus in the womb is bound to the whole 
maternal body by way of connected cords, whence through its soul, body and 
spirit it also perceives the passions of the mother’s soul, body and spirit (13.2.16, 
tr. Allen, with slight adjustments). 
 
*   *   * 
 
That the rational soul can act directly on nature – the principle of non-material 
causation – is an Avicennian principle that was rejected in the course of the thirteenth 
century by Peripatetic philosophers, including Albert and Thomas, who saw it as 
contradicting the Aristotelian principle that physical causation requires contact.
10 Ficino 
not only accepts this Avicennian principle but develops it further.  He regards it as 
possible for souls not only to affect physical nature directly, but also to affect other souls 
indirectly, via a descent into spiritus, in a process I would like to label “redundation” 
(from redundare, the verb Ficino uses to describe the process). Hence in Book III of the 
De vita, Ficino writes: 
 
For since they believe the celestials are not empty bodies but bodies divinely 
animated and ruled moreover by divine Intelligences, no wonder they believe that 
as many good things as possible come forth from thence for men, goods 
pertaining not only to our body and spirit but also flowing back (redundantia) 
somewhat into our souls, and not into our soul from their body but from their 
soul. (…) 
 
Finally, whenever we say “celestial goods descend to us,” understand (1) that gifts 
from the celestial bodies come into our bodies through our rightly-prepared spirit, 
(2) that even before that, through their rays the same gifts flow into a spirit exposed to them either naturally or by whatever means [grace? ascetic 
practices?], and (3) that the goods of the celestial souls partly leap forth into this 
our spirit through rays, and from there flow back [redundare] into our souls, and 
partly come straight from their souls or from angels into human souls which have 
been exposed to them – exposed, I say, not so much by some natural means as by 
the election of free will or by affection.
11  
 
A similar description of “redundation” can be found in Ficino’s argument to Plato’s Laws 
VI: 
 
But if these spirits act on our spirit, they act still more on bodies.  But the 
experience (passio) of human bodies, whether it is imported from from these 
spirits or from higher bodies, flows back (redundat) into the soul to the extent that 
the soul plunges itself into the body through natural or acquired desire.  But there 
is this difference, that these bodies move souls through our bodies, but spirits 
move souls through bodies and through souls and also through this spirit, which 
the doctors often call the knot of soul and body.
12 
 
It is through this process of redundation that Ficino in the De vita explains the influence 
of Jupiter and Saturn, respectively, on practical and theoretical reasoning.
13   
The indirect circulation of psychic forces through physical objects and back into 
soul is also, I suspect, how Ficino understands the process of education:  of one soul 
being formed by another through a sensory intermediary.  In Book XI, chapter 5 of the 
Platonic Theology, Ficino describes how the Socratic process of teaching is a matter of 
awakening seeds of knowledge that lie dormant in the minds of students, seeds that have 
already been implanted by higher divine principles.  The teacher is a minister, not a 
master; Socrates (using the image of the Theaetetus) is a midwife, not a father.  So much is familiar from Plato. But Ficino goes further and claims that the mind of Socrates 
possessed an active, divine power of awakening dormant knowledge in the soul of others: 
 
In the same work [Theages] Socrates tells how some people, when they shared his 
company and were close to him, and even though he said nothing, became more 
acute; similarly, when they left him, they suddenly became duller again.  It was as 
if this their wit’s power belonged to some divine influence, which, having 
streamed down from god, was penetrating the souls of Socrates’ friends through 
the genius and mind of Socrates.  
 
Here Socrates’ mind appears to have some supranormal ability to induce ratiocination, 
mediated somehow by his physical presence.  
In the same way, it is a key idea of Ficino’s educational theory that youths sunk in 
the world of sense can be aroused to contemplation by sensory “lures” and “baits”, which 
pique their interest and remind them of the god within.  Such lures and baits include the 
pleasure of literary forms and verse, virtuous companions, natural beauty, music, and 
other kinds of attractive “packaging” for philosophy.
14  In the De vita, Ficino sees these 
physical manifestations of the divine as magical devices for attracting souls: 
 
And so let no one think that any divinities wholly separate from matter are being 
attracted by any given mundane materials, but that daemons rather are being 
attracted and gifts from the ensouled world and from the living stars. Again, let no 
man wonder that Soul can be allured as it were by material forms, since indeed 
she herself has created baits of this kind suitable to herself, to be allured thereby, 
and she always and willingly dwells in them.  There is nothing to be found in this 
whole living world so deformed that Soul does not attend it, that a gift of the Soul 
is not in it.  Therefore Zoroaster called such correspondences of forms to the reasons existing in the World-soul “divine lures” and Synesius corroborated that 
they are magical baits.
15 
 
  The soul’s occult power of inducing contemplative experience in ensouled beings 
shows already that psychic magic, too, has two aspects, a subjective one – in which the 
soul can be influenced by higher powers via a physical or spirit medium – as well as a 
transitive one.  That is, through alienation, asceticism, sleep, or in other states of 
separation from the physical, the human soul can acquire a range of paranormal abilities 
that are beyond the experience of ordinary mortals.  Thus in the Platonic Theology (9.2.2) 
Ficino explains how many at the point of death acquire the ability to predict future 
events, as Socrates predicted the downfall and death of his accusers.  (Ficino gives here 
half-a-dozen historical examples).  The soul once out of the body is free from the 
constraints of time and space, and acquires greater freedom (and therefore power), 
clairvoyance, and powers of prophecy and telepathy.  While Ficino’s general theory is 
dependent on Avicenna, as we shall see, he seems in this passage to be indebted to 
Plutarch’s De genio Socratis (589B) where Socrates’ daimonion has such intense 
ratiocinative powers that these are transmitted to Socrates, who is able to receive its 
thoughts as though his soul possessed some special antennae. The soul in separation from 
the body becomes so strong that it is able to resist the attacks of sorcerers upon it, as 
Plotinus resisted the attacks of the magician Olympius and indeed turned his 
enchantments back upon him.
16 
 
*   *   * 
   A major unexploited source for the occult powers of the soul in Ficino’s writings 
comes in the arguments and epitomes to his translation of Plato’s Laws.  In the epitome to 
the fifth book, Ficino begins by remarking that we are daily surrounded by miracles in 
nature – the magnet, flintstones that strike sparks, gunpowder – and indeed by the whole 
of nature, the motion of the heavens and the artful construction of the universe.  We are 
ignorant of the causes of these wonders, yet we do not deny their effects.  No more 
should we deny the wonders performed by our souls in prodigies and oracles, for these 
too are attested by history and by “Mercurial, Pythagorean and Platonic authority.” Ficino 
then proceeds to find a metaphysical explanation for these phenomena. He notes that 
elements and spirits are the more efficacious the higher they rise in the scale of being, so 
pure elemental fire is more powerful than fire trapped in the terraqueous globe.  Heavenly 
light is more powerful than fire, and spirit more powerful than the heavens, for spirit 
gives life to and moves the heaven, or at least accompanies them in their life and 
movement.  These higher celestial spirits are also our consortes, and act on our souls 
through influx of images, like a faces in a mirror.  In this way they make our souls 
resemble them, so that our souls operate in ways nearly as marvelous as the celestial 
spirits.
17  Ficino does not cite an authority here, but the image of the mirror was a favorite 
one with Avicenna, who used it to explain how the soul’s higher cognitive powers could 
be activated by (without being causally dependent on) sensible natures.
18 Ficino employs 
it in a similar way, as an image to illustrate how spiritus, which is a physical vapor 
(however rarified), can be the occasion of knowledge in an immaterial soul. 
  But just as mirrors are prepared to receive images by their clear, smooth, glassy 
nature, so our souls may be prepared for the influx of higher forces, the divinities (numina). Our souls are prepared in that their nature is intellectual, in that they cling to 
the divine certainties through faith, they move themselves towards them in most ardent 
love, and they firmly remember them in hope.
19 Finally, if our souls have bodies naturally 
accommodated to them and carefully readied for them (e.g., through asceticism), certain 
instinctus slip down from the these deities (superi) into our minds, like vibrations 
transmitted from the strings of one lyre to another lyre similarly attuned. (The image is 
from Plotinus 4.4.42, where it is used to describe the power of prayer.).  It is thus that 
marvels, dreams, prophecies and oracles come to us. 
  Ficino then raises the possibility, citing Iamblichus and Porphyry, that these 
phenomena might be daemonically induced (with a string of forte’s which show his 
uncertainty or perhaps his fear of being charged with heterodoxy). A second possibility 
he raises is that occult forces at particular times and places convert the intentions of 
human minds to higher things and form those converted minds in the light of higher 
intelligent powers.   
 
Human minds are naturally distracted towards variety, but whenever they use 
their full power for a particular work, then – just as fire when oriented towards the 
heavens burns with the full force of its nature – so (Plato has no doubt) do our 
minds easily produce marvels greater than fire or heaven. …  Thus is that saying 
of the Gospel mightily confirmed, that our faith shall move mountains, and thus 
also are confirmed many things that Plato asserts [in the fourth and fifth book of 
the Laws] about oracles
20 
 
Ficino is here asserting that our rational souls, appropriately prepared by alienation from 
the body, can be directly attuned to receive the power of the intelligences beyond the heavens, and that these deities (probably to be identified with Ideas in Nous or Angel) 
can impart to the highest parts of our soul certain paranormal powers, including the 
power to perform wonders and to predict the future.
21 
 
*   *   * 
 
By far the most extensive discussion of the occult powers of the rational soul, 
however, occurs in Book XIII of the Platonic Theology, where Ficino is trying to prove 
the soul’s immortality by documenting its supra-physical powers and the tendency of 
those powers to increase the more the soul is separated from the body. In so doing he 
elaborates a naturalistic theory of such paranormal phenomena as psychosomatic effects, 
telepathy, clairvoyance, the evil eye, visions, prophecy, and miracles.  Miracles are 
defined as alterations to natural species, and among the miracles discussed are the power 
to command elements, change the weather, heal the sick, cast charms and spells, destroy 
another’s health through the use of the evil eye, perform acts of sorcery, and to levitate. 
All of these occult powers belong to the realm of soul-magic rather than naturalistic or 
demonic magic because they require the activity of a strong soul working directly, by 
non-material causation, on physical objects.
22  Ficino’s theory here is heavily indebted to 
Avicenna’s naturalistic account of the “sacred faculty” of prophecy in the De anima and 
Metaphysics, a circumstance that raises questions about the Florentine’s relationship to 
Christian orthodoxy, as we shall see.  Indeed, the fact that Avicenna is rarely named 
throughout this book despite his omnipresence in it may be a sign that Ficino was 
uncertain how his views would be received by ecclesiastical authorities. One of the few passages where Ficino does mention Avicenna is in 13.4.2, a 
paragraph where the Florentine defends his naturalistic theory of miracles and shows how 
it relates to the entire system laid out in the Platonic Theology:  
 
Perhaps you will be surprised if I inquire into the reasons behind miracles.  But 
listen to me. In the first book it was argued that there is a third essence under the 
angel but above the whole matter of the world, an essence which is formed by the 
divinity but itself forms matter, and which receives spiritual forms from the 
divinity but gives corporeal forms to matter.  In the third book it was also 
established that the third essence is nothing other than [all] rational souls, both our 
souls and souls higher than ours.  It follows that for the Platonists and the 
followers of Avicenna every rational soul through its essence and power is above 
the whole matter of the world and can move and form the whole – when that is, it 
becomes God’s instrument for doing so.
23 
 
The passage states the main theoretical principle for Ficino’s theory of soul magic, that 
the soul’s position in the universe gives it control over the matter of the universe, not just 
the matter of the individual ensouled body.  This point underlies Ficino’s account of how 
the soul, being a substance, can free itself from bodily influences and acquire power over 
nature.  The soul is by nature superior to bodies and can control all bodily things, but 
because of a certain fatal love and desire for rule, particular souls ordinarily devote 
themselves to particular bodies. The soul loses power while in the body because it is 
distracted with bodily cares “But if that particular instinct ceases, the life-giving power becomes free to be affected by a new instinct and in a way to rule and move another body 
(13.4.3).”  
Ficino uses in this passage the scholastic concepts of the intention and remission 
of forms, concepts elaborated in the fourteenth century by writers like Buridan and the 
Oxford “Calculators” to explain how forms, qualities, and quantities can intensify or 
relax in particular subjects without changing their essence, e.g., how heat can increase or 
decrease in an iron bar without losing its character as heat.
24 Ficino uses the terminology 
somewhat idiosyncratically to describe variations in the intimacy of the soul’s 
relationship with the body. It is possible under certain circumstances for the rational soul, 
whose idolon is the form of the body, to remit its presence in the body and turn to divine 
things; when it does so its power increases and it is able to affect other bodies besides its 
own: 
 
In short, since the reason is superior to the phantasy, when the reason is dedicated 
totally to God and directed to the one work of bestowing a benefit [e.g. healing], 
then the earlier natural desire of the rational soul joining it to its own body is fully 
remitted [remittitur admodum]: released from its own body, the rational soul acts 
upon another (13.4.11, tr. Allen with slight adjustments). 
 
This is an adequate explanation for how the soul does good works that affect other 
bodies. But it does not help explain how unreligious or even wicked souls like those of 
sorcerers sometimes are able to affect other bodies, for example through the use of the 
“evil eye”.  That was an important issue for Avicenna, too, who needed to find a 
theoretical basis for distinguishing Mohammed’s miracles from those of a sorcerer.
25 
Ficino’s solution resembles Avicenna’s in denying that the sorcerer has any access to divine power. Ficino cites (from Pliny the Elder) the examples of Illyrians and Triballi 
and Scythian women who could strike people dead by looking at them. These evils souls 
are effective outside of their own bodies, not because divine power draws them upwards 
and out of the body, but because the very intensity of their hatred for someone else remits 
the soul’s bond of affection with its own body.  
 
For when one emotion becomes inflamed, another cools off. Therefore in the 
intensifying of the malefic phantasy (in maleficae phantasiae intensione) the 
natural affection of the soul, which binds it to its body, is briefly remitted 
(remittitur paulisper), with the result that, freed to a greater degree from its body, 
it begins to transmute the new material to which it has just been attracted, as if to 
some new body of its own (13.4.9). 
 
But most of Ficino’s discussion is reserved for the good species of “strong souls”, 
of which there are four:  philosophers, poets, priests and prophets (13.2.1-8).  These are 
the kinds of men who are capable of alienation from the body and therefore of acting as 
conduits of divine power. Ficino finds plenty of material in the Platonic tradition and 
especially in the Phaedrus to document the ability of the first three classes of men to 
abstract themselves from the body. It is in his account of seers and prophets, by far the 
longest discussion of the four, that he relies most heavily on Avicenna; it is here that he 
first discusses the occult powers of the enraptured rational soul.  
As examples of prophetic powers Ficino lists the predictions of Diotima in the 
Symposium, the sibyls, the Delphic Oracle, prophetic dreams “experienced by everyone”, 
and the predictions of the Hebrew prophets. By leaving the body behind the rational soul 
enters the timeless world of Mind (or Angel) and thus acquires the power to see the future – to predict the recurrence of ages, mutations of realms, rainstorms and earthquakes 
(13.2.1, 23). The human mind climbs above fate, which rules nature, and is subject only 
to Providence. Like other minds in the order of Providence it is not ruled, but rules itself. 
“Thus the soul is positioned with regard to the laws of providence, fate and nature, not 
now as a passive subject, but as an active agent” (13.2.17).  
Human beings acquire the power of prophecy by laying themselves open to the 
influence of higher minds.  This happens in one of seven states of vacatio:  “in sleep, in 
syncope or swoon, in the melancholic humor, in the tempered complexion, in solitude, in 
wonder and in chastity” (13.2.24).  In these states the spirits or vapors used in sensation 
and motion are banished to the outer limbs and the soul is left in isolation from the body. 
These states, too are described in terms of intension and remission: “To the extent that 
external activity in increasingly remitted, however, internal activity is more and more 
intensified.” 
This account of the seven kinds of vacatio is taken from many sources but the 
theory behind it is Avicennian as well as some of the categories of askesis and certain 
other details.
26  Avicenna believed that some exceptional human minds, “holy minds,” 
had a special aptitude, when abstracted from the body, to be illuminated by the agent 
intellect (Ficino’s divine numina) and so to grasp the middle terms of syllogisms, that is, 
the first principles of necessary reasoning, even without having been taught.
27 This theory 
is clearly in the background of Ficino’s own explanation of the power of prophecy, 
though both thinkers are also drawing on Plotinus. As far as Ficino’s categories of 
vacatio are concerned, sleep, swoon and the tempered complexion are explicitly given by 
Avicenna as forms of askesis leading to prophetic experiences.
28 Other details of Ficino’s account probably taken from Avicenna include the assertion that morning dreams are 
more veridical (13.2.29); that Hercules and “very many Arabs who were seized by 
epilepsy” were particularly good at the interpretation of dreams (13.2.32); and the 
explanations of how our daily activities and concerns influence what is revealed to us in 
dreams (13.2.26-29).
29 
 
*   *   * 
 
  Avicenna’s theories of prophetic power were based not only on the lower power 
of the imagination and the higher, intuitive power of the “sacred mind” in askesis to be 
illuminated by the agent intellect.  He also described a third kind of prophetic power 
based in the will which allowed the prophet to perform wonders and miracles such as 
healing the sick, raising winds, causing rain and fertility, dispelling mists, and changing 
elemental species. Ficino adopts this aspect of Avicenna’s magic as well, discussing it 
most fully in Platonic Theology XIII, chapter 4.  
  Ficino begins with relatively humble examples of how the soul, operating through 
spiritus, is able to change foreign bodies.  He cites the example of our digestive system 
altering the foods we eat and a woman’s womb shaping a fetus. Gradually we work up to 
more powerful transitive acts where the soul acts more and more directly on bodies 
external to itself. Ficino considers the famous Avicennian theory of the evil eye (13.4.8), 
which was much discussed in Western sources since the thirteenth century; Ficino 
explains this as an intensifying of febrile or choleric spirits in the sorcerer’s fantasy, 
which then is conveyed by spiritus through the eyes to its victim.
30 The sorcerer’s power comes from his astrological sign and from the peculiar mixture of humors in his body. In 
much the same way Ficino explains the power of the Ethiopian catablepas and the 
basilisk, fabulous animals that can kill with their sight. 
  These examples may appear at first sight compatible with the conventional model 
of Ficino’s spiritual magic (though in fact at 13.4.9 Ficino says they are examples of the 
power of the rational soul over other bodies). But the next examples (13.4.10) take us 
unquestionably into the realm of psychic and mental magic. As the soul remits its 
presence in the body it acquires the power to bring blessings not only on its own body, 
but on those of others. When the reason “is fixed upon some good work and the soul is 
wholly intent on God,” men with special gifts, “with a tempered and celestial 
complexion,” men “nourished by pure foods,” the “doctors of mankind,” are able through 
prayer to bestow benefits such as health and healing on their own and other bodies. As 
examples of psychic healers Ficino cites Apollonius of Tyana, Pythagoras, Empedocles 
and Philolaus; as his theoretical authority he cites Plato in the Timaeus, Phaedrus, 
Epinomis and Republic (13.4.11).  These dialogues (he says) establish the sovereignty of 
the pious reason over “tyrannic phantasy”, the freedom of the intellectual soul to wander 
the universe and govern the world with the other celestial souls, and the power of soul 
joined to mind to issue the decrees of fate. But the parallel passage in Avicenna’s De 
anima is obviously much more germane to Ficino’s theoretical model than these rather 
strained allusions to Platonic dialogues.
31 
  In its final step (13.4.12) the human soul is able to quiet the phantasy, ignore 
discursive reason and live in its highest power of intuitive reason alone.  When this 
happens the soul becomes angel (or an angel:  evadit angelus) and seizes God with its whole heart.
32  Ficino assimilates this to the “theology of the divine John” when he says 
the latter describes the rebirth of the soul from God. The influence of God streams down 
through the angelic minds and moves the soul to lay aside its lower psychic powers and 
become angel. “He who commits himself entirely to this inspiration ceases to be a soul 
and becomes, being reborn from God, a son of God, an angel.” 
  Ficino goes on (13.4.13): 
 
If the soul naturally surpasses the world machine, and if it performs wonders even 
in foreign bodies through its inferior powers, what do we suppose it will do when 
it ascends to its head and emerges as angelic?  ... The soul will no longer be 
bewitching just one body or a  young body or be healing a sick man; it will then 
govern the spheres of the elements. 
 
Whereas before it only moved the four humors of the body, now it can move the four 
elements of the whole world, as though it were a World Soul.  
 
With that power alone, therefore, it will, under God’s command, rouse the winds 
and drag clouds into the clear sky and compel them to rain; then it will allay the 
winds and clear the air.
33 
 
  It is only at this point that Ficino acknowledges Avicenna, though he maintains 
that authority for these angelic powers in the human soul can also be found in Avicebron, 
“Egyptians” (presumably Hermes), Plutarch, Porphyry, Proclus and Zoroaster.  The 
theory of the angelic powers of the soul provides him with an allegorical key to explain 
reports that Zoroaster was able to surround his body with rays of light and levitate; it also 
does service to explain Hermes Trismegistus’ account of regeneration, Elijah’s fiery chariot, Paul’s rapture to the third heaven, and the glorified body that the saved will 
receive at the Last Judgement (13.4.14-16). Ficino ends the discussion (13.5.1-8) by 
claiming that this conception of the angelic powers of the human soul does not conflict 
with Divine Providence or Christianity. His final words on the subject (13.5.8) are the 
words he customarily employs when treading on dangerous ground:  
 
But individual points concerning miracles, points we have discussed from a 
Platonic viewpoint (ex Platonicorum mente), we affirm only insofar as they are 
approved by Christian theologians. 
 
*   *   * 
 
  Ficino was very familiar indeed with one important Christian theologian, St. 
Thomas Aquinas, who is cited explicitly and implicitly throughout the Platonic 
Theology.
34 So it is improbable that he would not have known that Thomas, along with 
St. Albert the Great and Giles of Rome, had condemned the relevant doctrines of 
Avicenna in the later thirteenth century. Partly this was because, as Aristotelians, they did 
not approve of the idea of non-material causation; but also there were theological 
objections.
35 In his De veritate, question 12, and in the Summa theologiae 2-2, qq. 171-4, 
Thomas attacked Avicenna’s position as too naturalistic; for Thomas, prophecy can only 
happen in virtute divina, not through any natural human power.  He himself makes a 
strong distinction between divine prophecy, a gift of the Holy Spirit, and natural 
prophecy, which relies on the imaginative and intellectual faculties and their contact with 
celestial forces and separated substances. In other words, he provides a standard to 
distinguish the Judaeo-Christian prophetic tradition from non-Christian prophecy. This is exactly what Ficino does not do. Throughout the passages we have examined Ficino 
constantly reduces pagan, Jewish, Christian and Muslim manifestations of the prophetic 
faculty to the same theoretical model. We have already mentioned Ficino’s list of strong 
souls with prophetic powers, which includes the Hebrew prophets along with Diotima, 
Socrates, Epimenides, the sibyls, the Delphic oracle (13.2.8).  But in discussing inspired 
dream interpreters Ficino lumps Joseph and Daniel with Hermes Trismegistus (13.2.31); 
and in describing souls divinely illuminated because of their tempered complexions he 
illustrates his account with the examples of Pherecydes of Syros, Pythagoras, and 
Plotinus (13.2.34).  Zoroaster and Orpheus are examples of divinatory powers acquired 
from solitude (13.2.36); St. John the Evangelist, Ezekial and Isaiah are examples of 
visions acquired from “the chastity of a mind devoted to God” (13.2.37); and angelic 
transformation was experienced by Zoroaster, Elijah and St. Paul (13.4.16). 
  Giles of Rome (d. 1316) also had serious theological reservations about 
Avicenna’s naturalistic accounts of sorcery and prophecy.  In the Errores philosophorum 
attributed to him
36 he condemns Avicenna for “believing that the evil eye is true, and that 
the soul operates not only in its own body but on others’.”  ... “Furthermore he errs 
concerning prophecy ... he speaks ill because it appears he holds that prophecy is natural, 
and he holds that prophecy flows down to us because of the relationship our soul has to 
supercelestial souls and to the last intelligence.”
37  Paola Zambelli has pointed out that 
article 112 of the Condemnation of 1277, condemning the doctrine that higher souls can 
imprint their powers on lower souls and the sensitive soul, is probably a confused attack 
on Avicennian magical and psychosomatic teachings.
38   In short, Ficino must have known he was pushing the envelope of orthodox 
Christian theology in espousing these more ambitious magical theories, and the 
concealment of his heavy debt to Avicenna may well have been designed to evade 
unwanted attention from the authorities. A few years after he published the Platonic 
Theology he came under investigation by the Inquisition for his magical writings,
39 and it 
is evident that his astrological teachings also challenged the medieval theological 
tradition.
40  So it should be no surprise that when he published his work on magic, the De 
vita, shortly after this episode, he should have emphasized the less controversial aspects 
of his magical teachings, focussing on spiritus and the lower psychic power of 
imaginatio, where he ran less risk of incurring ecclesiastical censure. He may, too, have 
been discouraged by the example of Galeotto Marzio whose De promiscua doctrina, 
which contained explicit references to Avicennian magic, was condemned around this 
time.
41  Whatever the reason, in assessing the character and development of Renaissance 
magic, modern scholars should not forget that just a few years earlier Ficino had 
published a work containing a far more ambitious and dangerous magical theory. When it 
came to asserting the dignity of man and his potential to exercise angelic and godlike 
powers, Ficino was no less radical than his student, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. 
 
James Hankins 
Harvard University 
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